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(, ") [10].

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[11].

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P_{MAX} ,
 $P_{MAX} < P_E$ [2;7].

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disbenefits) [8].

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[10].

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(PPF)

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[1;7].

[7].

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(MC)

(ΔTC)

ΔQ [4].

(MR)

(ΔTR),

(ΔQ): MR = ΔTR / ΔQ. MR

R(Q): MR =

dR(Q) / dQ = P [5].

(MU)

[3].

(MTR)

[13].

() [1].

(MB)

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() [7].

() () ()

() [8;11].

() [9].

() [13].

() [8].

， (， " " ($I_T = I_M + I_N$) [13].

“ ” () 1956 : () [8].

， [9].

() : [13].

() () [1].

([1].

" : (1) ; (2) ; (3)

(，) ， 25 50 [10].

() [1].

[1].

() [1].

[11].

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[13].

[4].

[4].

[1;13].

() [economy]

). (. - *economy*) [8].

) [4].

) [4].

[2].

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(I)

(Q_D)

$$E_I = (\Delta Q_D / Q_D) / (\Delta I / I)$$

I/I), $E_I = \% \Delta Q_D / \% \Delta I$ [2].

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([3].),

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() , (,) [4].

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() [1;7].

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[2].

$$MC = P_E = MB [7].$$

MC

P_E ,

MB,

;) [7].

() [8].

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— (—), (— efficiency) [8].

() [1;7].

() [1;7].

() [7].

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[2]. P Q_s .

) (MP , [4].

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[6].

$$H = S_1^2 + S_2^2 + S_3^2 + \dots + S_N^2, \quad S_i - (H), \quad N$$

$$+ S_2 + S_3 + \dots + S_N = 100. \quad (N=1) H=10\,000, \quad S_i$$

$$H \quad 1 (N=20000, \quad H=0.5).$$
 H [10].

$$MC: L = (P - MC) / P.$$

$$L = (P - AC)Q / PQ = AC. \quad L = (P - AC)$$
 [10].

() [2].

[3].

), [1].
 () [8].

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[11].

[6].

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-20%

- 20%
[13].

[3].

$U_2 + \dots + U_n$, $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n -$
 $X=(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots)$
 $U_n = f_n(X)$ [13].

$: W(U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n) = U_1 +$
 $U_1 = f_1(X), U_2 = f_2(X), \dots,$

[11].

) 1 (100%,

) -
[13].

) [8].

$(1+r)^{-t}$, $r -$

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) [13].

$I_k(k)$

(k)
 (I_4)

(I_8)

[10].

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[7].

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[11].

"*homo economicus* –

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[11].

: $s = MEB$ [11].

(s),

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: $t = MEC$ [11].

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(t),

() [3].

Q_E ,

P ,

Q ,

($P_E \leq AVC$).
[5].

[4].

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100%,
 100%),
 X- , I-) , % 100%
 (100-)% ();
 (100-)% [13].

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(P, Q_D) " - " [2].

[2].

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N , ,

$$-q_1(P), q_2(P), \dots, q_N(P), \quad Q(P) = q_1 + q_2 + \dots + q_N$$

(P, Q) [5].

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- [8].

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() - 75% , ()
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() , PPF ()
() [1;7].

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- 60%

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[3;6].

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[4].

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“ - ” () [12].

(60-), (1919), ; (). [11].

“ ” ; “ ”
 $Q_D = a - bP, () Q_S = c + fP, ()$ [2].

“ ” [13].

, : 1) ; 2) ,
(); 3) ; 4) [9].

, : - () ; - () ; [9].

() [9].

[6].

) () [12].

(PS)

, () [5;7].

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MC) , (; -
[5;7].

[3;7].

[13].

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[8;13].

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() P_{MIN} , $P \geq P_{MIN} > P_E$ [2;7].

() [3].

() [6].

[2;3].

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[4].

" ' " [1]. ;
(Q)
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(Q_D)
, [2].
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, (N-1)- , ,
 $(MC_N > 0)$ [11].
 $N,$

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 (, -) [1].

(E_{PQ})

(P_B)

$$: E_{PQ} = \% \Delta Q_A / \% \Delta P_B \quad (Q_A)$$

[2].

“ ”

D₁.

D₂,

P_{M2}

P_{M1}

M₁ M₂).

P=MC,

C₁ C₂).

P_{C1}

[10].

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(politics) [8].

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(policy) [8].

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(P)

(Q_D),

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$P=MC$ [5].

(MR), (MC): $MR=MC$.

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[10].

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[5].

() [2].

Q_s , E^- , Q_D , $Q_E=Q_S=Q_D$ [2].

[1].

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(*ATR*), T I [13].

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 r , [8].

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); (" " " " [7].

- : 1)
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 - ; 5)
- [5].

$(TC), (FC)$
 $(VC) [1;4].$
 (TR)
 $P \cdot Q, P, P \cdot Q, Q$
 [2;5].
 (TS)
 $P_E, [7]. Q_E$
 (TEB)
 Q
 $[11].$
 (TEC)
 Q
 $Q) [11].$
 (TSB)
 $(TPB) (TEB) [11].$
 (TSC)
 $: TSC = TPC + TEC [11].$
 $(I+r), [8].$
 $[11].$

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(() [11].) ;

(') [8].
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[8].

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(FC)

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[13].

$c(Q)$ ()

Q

$TC = c(Q)$,

[4].

Q

[3].

$$Q_D = f(P) \quad ; F \quad [2].$$

$$Q_S = a + bP, \quad a, b > 0 \quad [2].$$

$$W = F(U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n), \quad U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n$$

$$X = (x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots)$$

$$U_1 = f_1(X), U_2 = f_2(X), \dots, U_n = f_n(X) \quad [13].$$

$$W(U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n) = \min(U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n) \quad [13].$$

[10].

[8].

(P)

[2].

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[9].

: 1) (, ; 2) ;
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(E_D)

(, -10%). (1%)

$$E_D = (\Delta Q_D / Q_{D1}) / (\Delta P / P_1), \quad E_D = (\% \Delta Q_D) / (\% \Delta P).$$

$Q_D = F(P)$, $(dF(P)/dP): E_D =$
 $(dF(P)/dP) \cdot (P/Q_D)$ [2].

(E_S)

$$E_S = (\Delta Q_S / Q_S) / (\Delta P / P), \quad E_S = \% \Delta Q_S / \% \Delta P$$

(ΔQ_S) (ΔP)
 $/ \% \Delta P$ [2].

(MC)

($P = MC$); ()
 () ;
 () [10].

(AC)

($P = AC$); ()
 () ;
 () [10].

[9].

[10].

[7].

$$(NB_P) (\quad) (TB),$$

$$(TC): NB_P = TB - TC. \quad [7].$$

$$(NB_C) (TB),$$

$$(TC): NB_C$$

$$= TB - TC.$$

[7].

[5].

100%

[9].

$$(NB_T)$$

$$(NB_C)$$

$$(NB_P): NB_T = NB_C +$$

$NB_P.$

[7].

[11].

$$(\quad) [11].$$

$$(\quad) [11].$$

[2].

[9].

[1].

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